

## Message Text

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07  
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15  
AF-10 ARA-10 EA-07 EUR-12 NEA-10 DHA-02 TRSE-00  
ACDA-07 OMB-01 USIE-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00  
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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
TO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4896

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 USUN 2615

COPENHAGEN FOR AMBASSADOR MCHENRY

LONDON FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PORG, UN, SF, WA

SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: FIRST ATTEMPT AT TALKING POINTS FOR  
BRIEFING OF FRONTLINE STATES, ETC.

1. THE FOLLOWING, FOR THE INFORMATION AND COMMENTS OF  
AMBASSADOR MCHENRY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE, ARE A  
FIRST ATTEMPT AT TALKING POINTS PREPARED BY UKUN FOR USE  
IN BRIEFING THE FRONTLINE STATES, NIGERIA, SOUTH AFRICA  
AND THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL ON THE WESTERN FIVE TALKS  
WITH SWAPO.

2. PLEASE NOTE THAT THE TALKING POINTS ARE NOT COMPLETE  
AND HAVE NOT BEEN WORKED OVER IN THEIR ENTIRETY BY USUN  
OR THE FIVE; THUS, THEY DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE  
VIEWS OF THE NEW YORK CONTACT GROUP.

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QUOTE

THE FIVE'S BRIEFING OF SOUTH AFRICA, THE FRONTLINE STATES  
AND NIGERIA WOULD IN ALL CASES BEGIN WITH AN ORAL PRESENTATION  
OF THE NON-PAPER AGREED BETWEEN THE FIVE AND SWAPO ON 11 AUGUST.  
THEREAFTER, THE FIVE MISSIONS IN EACH CAPITAL WOULD GIVE THE  
GOVERNMENT CONCERNED A SUPPLEMENTARY ORAL BRIEFING BASED LARGELY

UPON THE APPROPRIATE POINTS OF THE CONTACT GROUP'S AGREED ASSESSMENT OF 12 AUGUST. THIS SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEFING WOULD BE TAILORED TO FIT THE MAIN PREOCCUPATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED, AND WOULD BOTH STRESS THE POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE TALKS WITH SWAPO AND THE FURTHER ACTION WHICH THE FIVE NOW HOPED EACH GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE, OR BE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND.

FOR SOUTH AFRICA

(A) THE CONTACT GROUP'S TALKS WITH SWAPO WERE BUSINESSLIKE, AND SWAPO WERE LED FOR THE FIRST TIME TO DISCUSS SERIOUSLY POSSIBLE PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS BETWEEN THE POSITIONS HELD BY THE UN ON THE ONE HAND AND YOUR GOVERNMENT ON THE OTHER.

(B) SWAPO'S INITIAL PRESENTATION, PRESUMABLY AGREED UPON AT THE MEETING OF SWAPO'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE IN LUSAKA, LISTED THOSE MAIN PRINCIPLES WHICH IN THEIR VIEW HAD TO BE MET IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. FIVE OF THESE DID CAUSE US GREAT DIFFICULTY, AND WE BELIEVE SHOULD NOT CAUSE YOU GREAT DIFFICULTY EITHER. THESE WERE FREE ELECTIONS, UNIMPEDED PROGRESS TO GENUINE INDEPENDENCE, RESPECT AND PRESERVATION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY, RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA, AND THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF NAMIBIA - THOUGH IT SHOULD BE NOTED, IN CONNECTION WITH THE LAST, CONFIDENTIAL

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THAT THE QUESTION OF WALVIS BAY'S FUTURE WAS NOT RAISED BY EITHER SIDE.

(C) IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE MAIN OBSTACLES RELATED TO THE NATURE OF THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND, MORE IMPORTANT, TO SWAPO'S DEMAND THAT ALL SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY FORCES SHOULD BE COMPLETELY WITHDRAWN BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. THE TALKS THEREFORE CONCENTRATED ON THESE TWO ISSUES, AND SECONDLY ON THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL PRISONERS.

(D) ON WITHDRAWAL, AND THE RELATED QUESTION OF MILITARY DISPOSITION DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, OUR TWO MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS WERE TO SECURE SWAPO'S ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE TO A CEASEFIRE AND TO THE CONFINEMENT TO BASE OF THEIR FORCES. WE DID NOT DISCUSS THE DETAILED CONDITIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE, WHICH IT WAS AGREED SHOULD PRECEDE THE PASSAGE OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE APPOINTMENT OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE LATTER'S ARRIVAL IN NAMIBIA. NOR DID WE JUDGE IT PRUDENT TO DISCUSS AT THIS STAGE WHERE SWAPO'S TROOPS WOULD BE CONFINED ON

AND AFTER THE DATE OF THE CEASEFIRE. SWAPO HAVE,  
HOWEVER, ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE THAT SUCH CONFINEMENT  
SHOULD BE SUPERVISED BY UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS.

(E) SWAPO WANTED WHAT THEY DESCRIBE AS A UN PEACEKEEPING  
FORCE. THEY DID NOT HAVE ANY CLEAR IDEAS ABOUT THE  
SIZE OF SUCH A FORCE, BUT THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT  
THEY MAY BE THINKING OF A COMPARATIVELY SMALL NUMBER  
OF PEOPLE. WE SUGGESTED THAT THE UN'S CHIEF RESPONS-  
IBILITY IN THIS FIELD WAS TO SUPERVISE A CEASEFIRE,  
AND THAT THIS COULD EQUALLY WELL BE EFFECTED BY  
CIVILIAN OR MILITARY OBSERVERS UNDER THE SPECIAL  
REPRESENTATIVE'S DIRECTION. YOU MIGHT LIKE TO CONSIDER,  
AS ONE POSSIBLE WAY OF BRIDGING THIS GAP, THE ORGANIS-  
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ATION OF AN APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF MILITARY OBSERVERS AS  
A GROUP ATTACHED TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. SUCH A  
GROUP COULD BE PORTRAYED AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND ELSE-  
WHERE AS A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE ON THE FAMILAR PATTERN.

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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
TO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4897

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 USUN 2615

COPENHAGEN FOR AMBASSADOR MCHENRY

LONDON FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE

(F) ON THE QUESTION OF THE RATE OF WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN ARMED FORCES, SWAPO REMAINED ADAMANT DURING THIS ROUND OF TALKS THAT ALL SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS MUST BE WITHDRAWN PRIOR TO THE OPENING OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. WE CONTINUED TO STATE OUR VIEW THAT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WOULD REQUIRE A PLAN OF PHASED SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL OVER THE WHOLE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE. WE BELIEVE THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT SWAPO MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT A LIMITED SOUTH AFRICAN FORCE SHOULD REMAIN FOR SOME AT LEAST OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. WE RECOGNISE THAT THIS IS FAR REMOVED FROM YOUR POSITION, BUT IF DISCUSSIONS ARE TO PROCEED, AND AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT IS TO BE REACHED, WE NOW URGENTLY NEED FROM YOU AN ILLUSTRATIVE PLAN OF PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF YOUR FORCES WHICH TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT IT IS NEITHER REALISTIC TO INSIST, AS SWAPO HAVE DONE HITHERTO, THAT ALL YOUR FORCES MUST LEAVE BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE ELECTION

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CAMPAIGN, NOR IS IT REALISTIC TO DEMAND, AS YOU HAVE DONE, THAT THE GREATER PART OF YOUR FORCES SHOULD REMAIN UNTIL SHORTLY BEFORE INDEPENDENCE. A PROPERLY SUPERVISED AND EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE SHOULD GREATLY REDUCE THE NEED FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF LARGE FORCES IN NAMIBIA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD; AND IT IS ALSO RELEVANT TO NOTE THAT SWAPO SEEMED TO ASSUME IN THEIR TALKS WITH US THAT ALL THEIR FOLLOWERS AT PRESENT IN EXILE WOULD RETURN TO NAMIBIA AT SOME STAGE AFTER THE ARRIVAL THERE OF THE UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, IN ORDER TO TAKE PART PEACEFULLY IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

(G) AS WE HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED, SWAPO RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE ROLE OF THE POLICE DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. WE HAVE NOT DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION IN ANY DETAIL WITH YOU SO FAR, BUT WOULD LIKE TO DO SO WHEN WE NEXT MEET.

(H) AS REGARDS THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, SWAPO INITIALLY TOOK THE POSITION THAT WHILE THEY DID NOT OBJECT TO THE PRESENCE OF SOME SOUTH AFRICAN PERSONNEL IN THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF NAMIBIA, THE UN HAD TO BE IN A DOMINANT POSITION. WE REPLIED THAT SWAPO'S POSITION MERELY REAFFIRMED THE STANDARD UN JURIDICAL VIEW OF THE PROBLEM, AND WE TOLD SWAPO THAT THE EXPRESSION "THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL WOULD HAVE TO SATISFY THE UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AT ALL STAGES" FULLY MET SWAPO'S PREOCCUPATIONS. SWAPO EVENTUALLY AGREED THAT THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WOULD HAVE TO

HAVE THE POWER TO APPROVE THE ACTIONS OF THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION, IN SO FAR AS THE TRANSITIONAL PROCESS WAS CONCERNED. SUBJECT TO THIS, SWAPO WOULD NOT OPPOSE THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL BY  
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SOUTH AFRICA. WE BELIEVE THAT, THOUGH BOTH SIDES WILL NO DOUBT PRESENT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL AND THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN THEIR OWN WORDS, THERE DOES NOW APPEAR TO BE UNDERLYING AGREEMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTER. IN PARTICULAR, SWAPO UNDERSTOOD THAT WHILE "APPROVAL" WOULD BE THEIR EXPRESSION, THE FIVE WOULD CONTINUE TO USE "TO BE SATISFIED WITH".

(I) YOU WILL HAVE NOTED FROM OUR EARLIER PRESENTATION THAT SWAPO APPEAR TO BE IN BROAD AGREEMENT WITH OUR DESCRIPTION OF THE TASKS OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND THE NATURE OF THE UN CIVILIAN PRESENCE. WHILE WE ACCEPT THAT MILITARY MATTERS ARE OF MORE CONCERN TO SWAPO THAN CIVILIAN MATTERS, AND THAT THERE IS NO AGREEMENT AS YET BETWEEN THE SIDES ON MILITARY MATTERS, WE DO BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED SOMETHING OF A BREAK-THROUGH ON THE CIVILIAN ASPECTS.

(J) IT FOLLOWS FROM THIS THAT, AFTER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM OUR SIDE, SWAPO EVENTUALLY ACQUIESCED IN ADVANCE CONTINGENCY PLANNING BY THE UN SECRETARIAT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 385, BEARING IN MIND

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ACDA-07 OMB-01 USIE-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00  
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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4898

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 USUN 2615

COPENHAGEN FOR AMBASSADOR MCHENRY

LONDON FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE

OF COURSE THAT NO FORMAL ACTION COULD BE TAKEN  
IN ADVANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL. WE HAVE  
NOT YET SPOKEN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STAFF TO BEGIN  
CONTINGENCY PLANNING, IN CONSULTATION WITH US AND  
?3-48, & 8, 8, \$ 5#-5 85 297) \$ ?3 3, 8?) 3 59 ?3&8,  
?6 :9, 8\$348, & 5#9 3 8 73 , NOTABLY IN THE FIELD OF  
UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, WHERE SOME  
MEASURE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES ALREADY  
APPEARS TO EXIST.

(K) IT WILL NOT SURPRISE YOU TO HEAR THAT SWAPO  
REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN ABOUT WHAT THEY  
REGARDED AS THE OPEN SUPPORT WHICH YOU HAD BEEN GIVING  
IN RECENT WEEKS TO THE TURNHALLE REPRESENTATIVES.  
WE HAVE ALREADY GIVEN YOU OUR VIEW THAT THE SOUTH  
AFRICAN GOVERNMENT MUST BE IMPARTIAL, AND SEEM TO BE  
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IMPARTIAL, DURING AND PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF THE  
ELECTORAL PROCESS. IN SPEAKING TO SWAPO, HOWEVER, WE  
POINTED OUT THAT THEIR COMPLAINTS REALLY UNDERLINED  
THE NEED FOR EARLY MOVEMENT TOWARDS AN ACCEPTABLE  
SETTLEMENT AND THE INSTALLATION OF A UN SPECIAL  
REPRESENTATIVE IN NAMIBIA.

(L) AS YOU WILL HAVE GATHERED FROM OUR EARLIER  
PRESENTATION, THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT ABOUT THE ROLE  
OF THE PROPOSED PANEL OF JURISTS. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER,  
THAT THIS IS A RELATIVELY MINOR PROBLEM, A SOLUTION  
TO WHICH SHOULD FALL INTO PLACE ONCE AGREEMENT HAS  
BEEN REACHED ON THE MAJOR ISSUES.

(M) AS REGARDS DETAINEES AND POLITICAL PRISONERS,  
SWAPO EXPRESSED THEIR DESIRE TO SEE ALL SUCH NAMIBIANS  
HELD BY SOUTH AFRICA RELEASED AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE.  
WE REITERATED OUR VIEW THAT THE SAME PRINCIPLE APPLIED  
TO ALL NAMIBIANS WHEREVER HELD, BUT THERE WAS NO  
SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF THIS MATTER.

(N) THE CONTACT GROUP LOOK FORWARD TO AN EARLY MEETING

WITH YOU, BUT BECAUSE OF OTHER COMMITMENTS CANNOT YET  
SUGGEST A TIME AND PLACE. WE SHALL GET IN TOUCH WITH  
YOU AGAIN, AND HOPE THEN TO LET YOU HAVE A LIST OF POINTS  
WHICH MIGHT USEFULLY BE DISCUSSED.

FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE TIME TO GIVE  
WALDHEIM A DETAILED BRIEFING ON ALL ASPECTS OF OUR TALKS  
WITH SWAPO BEFORE HE LEAVES FOR LAGOS. IT IS SUGGESTED  
THEREFORE THAT AT THIS STAGE WALDHEIM SHOULD SIMPLY BE  
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GIVEN AN ORAL PRESENTATION OF THE AGREED NON-PAPER, FOLLOWED  
BY THE PARTICULAR POINTS ON CONTINGENCY PLANNING SET OUT  
BELOW; AND THAT HE SHOULD BE TOLD THAT THE FIVE WOULD BE  
HAPPY TO HAVE A FULLER DISCUSSION WITH HIM AT A CONVENIENT  
MOMENT.

(A) PRESENTATION OF AGREED NON-PAPER.

(B) AS YOU WILL SEE, WE EXPLAINED TO SWAPO THAT IT WOULD  
BE VERY DIFFICULT TO MOVE AHEAD, PARTICULARLY IN FORMULATING  
A MANDATE FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL, UNLESS THE UN SECRETARIAT  
WERE PREPARED TO MAKE SOME CONTINGENCY PLANNING OF THEIR  
OWN, AND NOT SIMPLY TO RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION  
BY THE FIVE. SWAPO INDICATED TO US THAT THEY HAD NO  
PROBLEM WITH THE SECRETARIAT COMMENCING SUCH PLANNING IN  
CONNECTION WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 385, BEARING  
IN MIND, OF COURSE, THAT NO FORMAL ACTION COULD BE TAKEN  
IN ADVANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL.

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ACTION IO-14

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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
TO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4899

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 USUN 2615  
COPENHAGEN FOR AMBASSADOR MCHENRY

LONDON FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE

(C) WE ENTIRELY AGREED WITH SWAPO THAT FORMAL ACTION  
WOULD REQUIRE SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL. WE WOULD HOPE,  
HOWEVER, THAT THE CONCERNS YOU EXPRESSED TO US AT OUR LAST  
MEETING ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES OF PROCEEDING WITH CONTINGENCY  
PLANNING WITHIN THE SECRETARIAT IN THE ABSENCE OF PRIOR  
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES ON THE BASIC ISSUES  
HAVE NOW BEEN DISPELLED BY SWAPO'S WILLINGNESS TO  
AGREE TO SUCH PLANNING. WE VERY MUCH HOPE, THEREFORE,  
THAT WHEN YOU RETURN TO NEW YORK, AND AFTER FURTHER  
DISCUSSION IF NECESSARY WITH US, YOU WILL AGREE THAT  
SUCH PLANNING SHOULD NOW BE UNDERTAKE.  
SOME THOUGHT WILL NEED TO BE GIVEN TO THE  
LEVEL OF STAFFING REQUIRED FOR SUCH AN OPERATION AND  
TO WHICH COUNTRIES MIGHT BE APPROACHED AT A LATER STAGE  
TO PROVIDE INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS OF  
INDIVIDUALS FOR THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES STAFF.  
OTHERWISE THERE IS A REAL RISK OF A LENGTHY INTERVAL  
BETWEEN THE PASSAGE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION  
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AUTHORISING THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE,  
AND UNITED NATIONS ABILITY TO MUSTER THE REQUISITE  
NUMBER OF STAFF TO ACCOMPANY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE,  
AND SO TO INAUGURATE UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE TRAISITIONAL  
PERIOD.  
UNQUOTE  
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## Message Attributes

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**Decaption Date:** 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Note:**  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
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**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**TAGS:** PORG, PDEV, SF, WA, US, UK, GE, CA, FR, UN, SWAPO  
**To:** COPENHAGEN LONDON  
**Type:** TE  
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